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AERONAUTICAL NOISE IN CANADA 1
By HUGH W. SiLVERMAN, Q.C. and JoHN D. EVANS*
Introduction
The 1960's and 1970's may become known in history as the age of
pollution. It is almost a commonplace of our times to be concerned about
and with the environment and its pollution. Years of laissez-faire thinking,
inaction and apathy have created a world which every school child today
can tell you is polluted. The air, water, land, flora, fauna, everything is said
to be polluted, and conservation is the prime target to achieve. It is a "hot"'2
topic, and any politician who wants to make news can blurt out anything he
wants on the topic so long as he uses the magic word "pollution". Bills are
proposed in legislatures;3 politicians are thinking of new ways to put the
pollution issue on to the legislative books; and suggestions are made for noise
pollution abatement legislation.4
The universal concern with pollution, however, may soon be a totally
dead issue in the wake of new and advanced techniques and technology to
cope with the problem; and it may not be too farfetched to speculate that
the problem of pollution may some day be characterized as one indigenous
to the 1960's and 1970's. We should recall the words of Thorstein Veblen
who said in 1899: "The evolution of society is substantially a process of
mental adaptation on the part of individuals under the stress of circumstances
which will no longer tolerate habits of thought formed under and conforming
to a different set of circumstances in the past."5
*Hugh W. Silverman, Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Windsor. John D.
Evans, member of the 1972 Graduating Class, Faculty of Law, University of Windsor.
I This study will focus only on commercial airlines and public airports.
2 Hot today, but old in the annals of Jewish religious literature, for one finds in
the Babylonian Talmud, Baba Bathra, chapter 2, mishnah 3 directives against the opera-
tion of a business which may be a nuisance, and against the establishment of a court-
yard shop which may disturb people's sleep on account of noise.
3 See, for example, four Ontario bills which were proposed but have not become
law: The Noise Pollution Control Act, 1971, Bill 46, First Reading on May 14, 1971;
and An Act to Provide for the Prevention of Noise Pollution and Air Pollution by
Aircraft, Bill 137, First Reading July 21, 1971; The Noise Pollution Control Act, 1972,
Bill 59, First Reading April 10, 1972, Second Reading May 23, 1972; An Act to regulate
the Operation of Aircraft over Ontario and to investigate the Effect and Consequences
of Sonic Booms, 1972, Bill 146, First Reading May 25, 1972.
4 Brogan, The Need for A Noise Pollution Abatement Act (1971), 11 Natural
Resources Journal 721.
5 The Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study of Institutions (1899),
(reprint by The Modem Library, Inc., New York, 1934) at 192. Consider also the
statement by Sir George Thomson: "Science limits technology at the same time it feeds
it ... We expect too much of mechanical ingenuity ... But there are things they
[inventors] cannot do, things prohibited by the nature of nature as we understand it":
Thomson, The Foreseeable Future (Cambridge: 1955) reprinted in Science and Sensi-
bility ed. James R. Neuman, (New York: Simon and Schuster Paperback, 1961) at
630, 631.
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While reaction ranged the full spectrum of appoval for and rejection of
the federal and Ontario announcements made on Thursday, March 2, 1972
for the acquisition of 18,000 acres in Pickering and Markham Townships
near Toronto as the site of a second major international airport in Ontario,"
John Gelner tells us:
The most important question in the controversy over the new Toronto airport in
Pickering Township has been completely overlooked. No one has asked - in
public at least - why build an airport with long runways when revolutionary
new aircraft for short runways are just around the corner?7
The new type of aircraft QSTOL (quiet short take-off and landing) can
be used for short and medium range flights, will require shorter runways,
and the "noise 'footprint' - the distance on the ground over which offensive
noise is spread by an aircraft during take-off or landing - will reportedly
be one-tenth that of a large jet. This means QSTOL-ports will take up much
less land and, even if closer to the metropolitan core, will not cause unaccept-
able noise pollution. ' 8
A few definitions about the words noise and pollution. "Noise is un-
wanted sound" and the Latin word "polluere", to defile, gives us our word
"pollution".10
When Orville and Wilbur Wright succeeded in putting the first man-
made airplane into sustained flight at Kitty Hawk, North Carolina, in 1903
no doubt the sure, steady roar of the engine was music to their ears. How-
ever, the urban dweller living near an airport today would not be so enthu-
siastic about the music of the roar of jet engines.
Within a period of less than seventy years aviation has progressed from
a one-seater, single prop machine to giant, multi-engined aircraft which can
fly faster than the speed of sound, and in an age of such rapidly advancing
technology, it is no surprise that new and far-reaching situations and conse-
quences arise which the cistomary slow-moving process of the law has not yet
been able to properly meet. With the advent of jet aircraft in commercial
43The Globe and Mail, Friday, March 3, 1972 at 1, cols. 8, 9 at 10. The other
Ontario major international airport is at Malton. On Tuesday, January 30, 1973, the
federal government announced it would proceed with its plans for this new airport:
The Globe and Mail, Wednesday, January 31, 1973, at 1, cols. 6-9.
7An Overlooked Factor in Airport Row, The Globe and Mail, Saturday, March
18, 1972 at 7. In making the announcement to proceed with the Pickering airport plans,
Transport Minister Jean Marchand is quoted as saying (in a statement filed in the
Commons) that STOL and "high-speed ground transport" are not "relevant nor eco-
nomic beyond 300 to 500 miles" ... [and] "the fastest-growing air market is the long-
haul - domestic, continental and international": The Globe and Mail, Wednesday,
January 31, 1973, at 1, col. 8.
8Id.
o Hart, Pollution and Conservation (1971), 45 Aust. U.. 473 at 478.
10 Id., at 484 (comment by R. W. Baker, who goes on to say that "Australia like
all other communities in the world is faced with defilement of the air, of the land and
of the sea, of our total environment.").
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operations in the late 1950's, aircraft noise and airport noise was no longer
just an irritation, but became a widespread problem.1
It appears that we may be obliged to live with a certain amount of noise
in the interest of more efficient aeronautical transportation, i.e., the balancing
of interests, the private v. the public domains.1
2
Roscoe Pound tells us that in modem times it is appropriate "to think
of law as a social institution to satisfy social wants - the claims and demands
and expectations involved in the existence of civilized society - by giving
effect to as much as we may with the least sacrifice, so far as such wants may
be satisfied or such claims given effect by an ordering of human conduct
through politically organized society."' 3 Aircraft noise pollution is a fact of
living today - however, we could recall and consider the maxim, sic utere
tuo ut alienum non laedas, which means, use your own property in such a
way as not to injure that of another.14
It is interesting to note that there has been a paucity of litigation in
Canada to date in regard to noise emitted by aircraft at airports and although
one could speculate as to the reasons for this, nevertheless such dearth of
" After briefly mentioning the history of noise problems starting with Troy and
Rome, the Aviation Planning and Research Division, Civil Aviation Branch of the
federal Ministry of Transport in a paper entitled General Comments on Aircraft Noise,
July, 1970 sublimely says, at 1: "Among the significant noise producers of today are
trains, freeways, factories and aircraft, all subjecting people to what is very often an
objectional level of noise." In a paper prepared by John E. K. Foreman of the Faculty
of Engineering Science, University of Western Ontario on Noise Pollution in Modern
Day Society, the divergent noise polluters of today are examined, and he says that
"noise pollution is symptomatic of our modern infatuation with mechanical gadgets".
12 Just as in nuisance the public interest may override private interests: Sheller v.
City of London Electric Lighting Company, [1895] 1 Ch. 287, 295 where Kekewich, J.
who was upheld on appeal as to the finding of nuisance, but reversed in the remedy
granted (he had refused an injunction, but it was granted on appeal), said: "It is well
settled that power to do a particular thing - as, for instance, to construct a railway -
does not justify the undertakers (to use the general word) in doing that thing so as
to commit a nuisance, unless by express language or by necessary implication that is
stated or must be inferred". For a discussion of the differences between a public
nuisance (one which in its effect is widespread and indiscriminate) and a private nui-
sance (concentrated in its effects) see Attorney-General for Ontario v. Orange Produc-
tions Ltd., [1971] 3 O.R. 585 at 588-91 (Wells, CJ.H.C.) where an interim injunction
until trial was granted to restrain the holding of a rock music festival as a public
nuisance on the grounds inter alia of the potential for excessive noise. See also Melle,
Private Legal Action for Air Pollution (1971), 19 Clev. St. L.R. 480.
13 An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1959, Yale Paperbound) at 47.
14The maxim has not fared well. In Rose v. Socony-Vacuum Corporation,
(1943) 173 A. 627 at 629 (Rhode Island Supreme Court), Murdock, J. notes: "This
maxim, ... affords little, if any, aid in the determination of the rights of parties in liti-
gation. If it be taken to mean any injury to another by the use of one's own, it is not
true, and if it means legal injury, it is simply a restatement of what has already been
determined. T'he maxim ... is mere verbiage. A party may damage the property of
another where the law permits; and he may not where the law prohibits: so that the
maxim can never be applied till the law is ascertained; and, when it is, the maxim
is superfluous'. Erle, J. in Bonomi v. Backhouse ... The maxim is undoubtedly a
sound moral precept expressing an ideal never fully attained in the social state."
1972]
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litigation does not of itself presuppose the absence of any noise problem. 5
By way of contrast one finds a plenitude of such litigation in the United States
where the problem has reached more critical proportions.16
Aircraft and Airports
Before they can operate, Canadian commercial air carriers must obtain
15 To date, aircraft noise litigation has mainly been confined to the situation of
overflights of aircraft. See Nova Mink Ltd. v. Trans-Canada Airlines, [1951] 2 D.L.R.
241 (N.S. S.C.); Lacroix v. R., [1954] Ex. C.R. 69; Darowany v. The Queen, [1956] Ex.
C.R. 340; Gagnon v. Regina, [1970] Ex. C.R. 714; but Shepherd v. The Queen, [1964] Ex.
C.R. 274 dealt inter alia with airport noise. It is suggested by the Ministry of Transport in
General Comments on Aircraft Noise, supra note 11 at 7, 8, that although aircraft may
be improved, and airports more effectively utilized for reduction of noise (e.g., by pre-
ferential runway utilization), it is neither practical nor possible to move airports away
from built-up areas, hence "it is equally important that communities themselves be
prepared to accept some degree of responsibility towards protecting their valuable eco-
nomic asset the airport ... through responsible compatible land use management in
the vicinity of the airport."
10 See, for example, the story which appeared in The New York Times, Wednes-
day, July 21, 1971, at 1, col. 4 Jet Noise Dooming Homes Near Los Angeles Airport,
telling of the purchase by the City of Los Angeles of three residential neighbourhoods
covering more than 400 acres at a cost of almost $300 million.
See also the numerous articles and materials discussing the multitude of cases concern-
ing airport and aircraft noise in the United States: Airplane Noise: Problem in Tort Law
and Federalism (1961), 74 Harv. L.Rev. 1581; Reed, Comment: Batten v. United States
(1962) 306 F. 2d 580, (1963), 371 U.S. 955, (1963) 372 U.S. 925, in (1963), 9
McGill LJ. 246, and Comment (1963), 16 Vand. L Rev. 430; Hill, Liability for
Aircraft Noise - The Aftermath of Causby and Griggs (1964), 19 U. Miami L. Rev.
1; Dygert, An Economic Approach to Airport Noise (1964), 30 J. Air L. & Com. 207;
Airplane Noise, Property Rights, and the Constitution (1965), 65 Colum. L. Rev. 1428;
Tondel, Noise Litigation at Public Airports (1966), 32 J. Air L. & Com. 387; Fleming,
Aircraft Noise: A Taking of Private Property Without Just Compensation (1966), 18
So. Carolina L Rev. 593; Jet Noise in Airport Areas: A National Solution Required
(1967), 51 Minn. L. Rev. 1087; Haar, Airport Noise and The Urban Dweller: A Pro-
posed Solution (1968), 159 N.Y.LJ. 4; Seago, The Airport Noise Problem and Air-
port Zoning (1968), 28 Maryland L. Rev. 120; Port Noise Complaint (1970) 6 Harv.
Civ. Rights - Civ. Lib. L. Rev. 61; Larsen, Improving the Airport Environment: Effect
of the 1969 FAA Regulations On Noise (1970), 55 Iowa L. Rev. 808; Harper, The
Dilemma of Aircraft Noise at Major Airports (1971), 10 Transportation Journal 5;
The Airport Noise Cases: Condemnation By Nuisance and Beyond (1971), 7 Wake
Forest L. Rev. 271; Federal vs. State Control of Aeronautical Noise Pollution (1971),
5 Suffolk U. L Rev. 1093; Ticer, Legal Methods of Eliminating Certain Undesirable
By-Products of the Air Transportation Industry (1971), 11 Natural Resources Journal
177; Fadem & Berger, A Noisy Airport is a Damned Nuisance! (1971), 3 Southwestern
U. L. Rev. 39; Benshoff, Air Law - The Memory Lingers On: Ad Coelum in the
1970's - Some New Approaches (1971), 20 De Paul L. Rev. 525; Lesser, The Air-
craft Noise Problem: Federal Power but Local Liability (1971), 3 Urban Lawyer 175;
Danforth, Mercury's Children in the Urban Trap: Community Planning and Federal
Regulation of the Jet Noise Source (1971), 3 Urban Lawyer 206; Sackman, Air Rights
- A Developing Prospect (1971), 3 Urban Lawyer 238; Gottlieb, Land Use Controls
for Airport Planning (1971), 3 Urban Lawyer 266; Lowenfeld, Aviation Law, chapter
V, 'The Problem of Aircraft Noise" (New York: Matthew Bender, 1972); Meyer,
Air And Noise Pollution Surrounding Airports: East Haven v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.
(1972), 1 Environmental Affairs 862; Goldstein, Aircraft Noise and the Selection of
Airport Sites (1972), 4 Urban Lawyer 548; Lloyd, Airport Noise: An Inadequate Judi-
cial Response (1972), 4 Conn. L. Rev. 634; and see also Anthrop, The Noise Crisis
(1970) 20 U. of T.LJ. 1 at 11-17.
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and hold a valid and subsisting licenCe 17 from the Canadian Transport Com-
mission.' The Minister of Transport looks after the licensing of pilots, regis-
tration of aircraft, and licensing, inspection and regulation of all aerodromes
and air-stations. 19 In the United States, section 104 of the Federal Aviation Act
of 195820 specifically declares that "any citizen of the States [has] a public
right of freedom of transit through the navigable airspace of the United States"
whereas "the right to fly in Canada is granted in a negative sense, the infer-
ence being that only if one has proper licences and the aircraft is registered
may one fly it.1'21
The major public airports in Canada "are owned and operated by the
Federal Government."22 The planning, arrangement, financing and location
of airports, in practice, appears to be a tri-government function (federal,
provincial and municipal). The federal Minister of Transport makes regu-
lations governing the conditions for use and operation of aircraft;23 the
height, use and location of buildings and utilization of lands therewith, by
making zoning regulations; 24 and any person whose property is injuriously
affected by the operation of a zoning regulation can recover compensation 0
(but there is a two year limitation period).20
The whole field of aerial navigation legislation belongs to the federal
government,27 and accordingly when a municipality, relying upon a provincial
statute, empowering it to pass bylaws for licensing, regulation and prohibi-
tion of the erection of aerodromes, passed such a bylaw, the Supreme Court
of Canada held it to be ultra vires.28 The Province of Ontario in The Airports
17Aeronautics Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. A-3, ss. 16(1), 17(1). Damage resulting from
foreign aircraft in flight gives rise to a cause of action for compensation, but not "if
the damage results from the mere fact of passage of the aircraft through the airspace
in conformity with existing air traffic regulations": Foreign Aircraft Third Party
Damage Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. F-28, Schedule, chapter 1, article 1(1).
18 Established under the provisions of the National Transportation Act, R.S.C. 1972,
c. N-17, Part I, ss. 6-28.
19 Aeronautics Act, supra, note 17 s. 6(1) (a) (b) (c).
20 72 Stat. 740, 49 U.S.C. 1304.
21 Rosevear, Noise in the Vicinity of Airports and Sonic Boom (1969), 17 Chitty's
LJ.3. In a recent case, the accused in Regina v. Joronen, [1972] 5 W.W.R. 367 at 371,
B.C. S.C.) was acquitted with respect to a charge of flying an aircraft below minimum
height limits over an "open air assembly of persons" in contravention of Air Regula-
tion 529(a) made pursuant to the Aeronautics Act, supra, note 17, and the court noted
that this regulation was made "primarily for the protection of the lives and property
of persons in built-up areas ..
22 Id., at 5.
2 3 Aeronautics Act, supra, note 17, s. 6(1) (d); and for aerial routes and their use
and control: s. 6(1) (h).
24 Id., s. 6(1) (j), and see also subsection 7.
25 Id., s. 6(10).
281d., s. 6(11).-
271n Re the Regulation and Control of Aeronautics in Canada, [1932] A.C. 54,
at 77.
2
8 Johannesson v. Rural Municipality of West St. Paul, [1952] 1 S.C.R. 292, (1953),
69 C.R.T.C. 105.
1972]
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Act 20 provides that the province may enter into agreements with other govern-
ments concerning the establishment, extension, improvement or maintenance
of airports in Ontario; 30 and can provide funds for purchasing, leasing or
acquiring airport lands,31 and can establish, operate and maintain airports.32
In 1968 the federal Department of Transport disclaimed the right "to con-
trol land use in the vicinity of airports" except with respect to height of
structures s3 Although airport location sites are within the federal domain,
the Province of Ontario controls all development and utilization of land
adjacent to airports through The Planning Act,34 and municipal councils
may pass bylaws prohibiting the use of lands, erection and use of buildings,
regulating the cost or type of construction of buildings,3 5 and pass building
bylaws.3 6 Recently the Ontario Court of Appeal delineated the areas of juris-
diction between federal and provincial governments with this explanation:37
... the whole object, scope, and effect of The Aeronautics Act ... is to provide
for all matters relevant to aerial navigation ... [and] the beneficial use of any
lands surrounding an airport is a matter solely under the control of the provincial
authorities ... [and] any beneficial uses of the land which would not interfere
with or affect aerial navigation are not the subject-matter of The Aeronautics Act;
they remain solely within the jurisdiction of the Province.
In point of fact in establishing airport locations the federal government
creates "an extensive buffer zone, sometimes called 'noise lands' ,8 to cope
with possible noise pollution problems.3 9 In the area of noise pollution, if
we can judge by past performances, there probably will be on-going con-
tinuing consultations between the federal, provincial and local authorities on
2.1RS.O. 1970, c. 17.
801d., s. 2(1).
81 Id., s. 3.
82 Id., s. 4. Municipal councils may pass bylaws to establish, operate, maintain and
improve air harbours or landing grounds in compliance with the Air Regulations
(Canada): The Municipal Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 284, s. 352(9).
83 Rosevear, supra, note 21 at 5; McNairn, Aeronautics and The Constitution
(1971), 49 Can. Bar Rev. 411 at 443.
84 R.S.O. 1970, c. 349, see especially s. 29.
85 Id., s. 35.
36 Id., s. 38.
837 Bramalea Consolidated Developments Ltd. v. Attorney-General for Ontario and
the Minister of Municipal Affairs of Ontario, [1971] 2 O.R. 570 at 571 per Aylesworth,
J.A.
88 McNairn, supra, note 33 at 441. As already indicated, the recently announced
plans of the federal government to acquire lands in Pickering and Markham Town-
ships near Toronto were met with mixed reactions: The Globe and Mail, Friday, March
3, 1972, at 1, 10, which entitled its editorial at 6, "We bin robbed."
80 Cf. the comment of Street, J. in Hopkin v. Hamilton Electric Light and Cataract
Power Co. (1901), 2 O.L.R. 240 at 247, in speaking of railways: "To ask a railway
company to buy all the land within the limits of the nuisance they cause by smoke, fire,
and vibration would be prohibitive, but the same considerations do not apply to the
case of isolated works..."
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the subject of airport noise pollution, as such discussions have taken place
in the past.40
Great Britain has specific legislation governing aeronautical noise,41 but
there is nothing in our federal aeronautical legislation on the subject.4 Muni-
cipalities may have the power to pass bylaws to prohibit or regulate disturb-
ing noises43 or to abate public nuisances; 44 and there is provincial legislation
to control noise pollution.45 A municipal anti-noise bylaw was held to be
ultra vires in R. v. Rice48 as it infringed on the federal field of shipping and
navigation; and a municipal air pollution bylaw likewise was held to be
40 See Aircraft Noise At Malton Airport, Ontario Department of Municipal Affairs,
January 1960; and Supplement No. 1, December 1961. For an in-depth study of noise at
a specific airport see McClure, Some Projected Effects of Jet Noise on Residential
Property Near Los Angeles International Airport by 1970 (being a paper submitted to
the Unversity of Southern California in 1969 as a thesis). Cf. Higgins, Economic Im-
pact of Alternative Sites for the Proposed New Montreal International Airport (1969);
Boelter, Environmental Law - Chicago's Third Municipal Airport - A Proposed
Course of Action for Its Prevention (1971), 21 De Paul L Rev. 207. See also Doyle,
We May Yet Have a Quiet Environment: The New California Airport Noise Regulations
(1972), 12 Santa Clara Lawyer 79; Second Federal Airport Noise Abatement
Plan FY 1970-71, January 1971, which as stated in the Preface, "is the second to be
developed by the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Systems Development and
Technology within the Office of the Secretary of Transportation", Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.
41 See The Civil Aviation Act 1949 (12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6 c. 67), s. 41(2) which
provides that no action shall lie in nuisance caused by aircraft on an aerodrome; s. 8,
as amended by The Civil Aviation Act 1968, c. 61, provides that regulatory orders may
be made requiring aircraft to hold certificates of compliance with respect to noise and
also sets the outer limit for speed over the U.K. The Air Navigation (General) Regu-
lations 1949, statutory instrument 374, deal with the conditions under which aircraft
may make noise and vibration. Generally, see The Law on Noise (London: Noise
Abatement Society, 1969) at 32-35; McNair, The Law of the Air ed. Kerr and Evans,
(3rd ed. London: Stevens & Sons 1964) at 122-128; Seabrooke, Air Law (London:
University of London Press Ltd., 1964) at 141, 190; Duerden, Noise Abatement (New
York: New York Philosophical Library, 1971) at 229-231. The Noise Abatement Act
1960, 8 & 9 (Eliz. 2, c. 68, s. 1(7) (specifically provides that it does not apply to aircraft
noise and vibration, although it may apply to model aircraft: The Law on Noise, supra,
at 32. In England these legislative provisions "present a most substantial obstacle to
the success of claims in respect of what might otherwise constitute an actionable nui-
sance in many cases": McNair, supra, at 124. The legislative effect is, as indicated by
McNair, that aircraft can operate and make noise, in accordance with prescribed
regulations; however, a breach thereof might, of course, be actionable. See also Zimmer
and Burhenne, Airfield Noise Abatement in the Federal Rpublic of Germany (1972),
12 Natural Resources Journal 354.
42 Fink, Canadian Law and Aircraft Noise Disturbance: A Comparative Study of
American, British and Canadian Law (1965), 11 McGill LJ. 55 at 60; (1969) 17
Chitty's L. 145 at 147.
43 The Municipal Act, supra, note 32, s. 354 (118).
44 Id., s. 354(120).
45An Act to Protect the Natural Environment, S.O. 1971, c. 86, s. 1(a) defines
contaminant as including sound and vibration; section 1(1) defines pollutant as any
contaminant present in the natural environment in excess of the maximum permissible
amount; section 1(i) defines natural environment as meaning the air, land and water
of the Province of Ontario.
46 [1963] 1 C.C.C. 108 (Ont., Mag's Ct.).
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ultra vires as it infringed on the same federal domain in R. v. C.S.L. Ltd.47
Nevertheless, the right and power to operate a transportation system author-
ized by federal law, such as a railway line, does not preclude recovery for
nuisance, provided the railway line has not been negligent in its operations4 8
i.e., so long as there is compliance by the railway with its governing statute,49
which may either expressly or impliedly permit the nuisance, there is no
right of recovery for nuisance.50 If an act has been legislatively sanctioned
there is no cause of action for any consequent nuisance which is the "inevit-
able result" of the authorized act.51 If the federal government fails to enact
legislation governing aeronautical noise, provincial or municipal noise legis-
lation probably would not be effective qua aircraft and airports.5 2 In the
United States local attempts to control air traffic, and thereby diminish aero-
nautical noise problems, have not been particularly successful.53 Whether by
enactment of local ordinances or applications for injunctive relief, the general
trend 4 in the United States has been to reject these efforts (restricting hours
47 [1960] O.W.N. 277, 127 C.C.C. 205, [1961] O.W.N. 89 (Ont. Co. Ct., But where
the Government of Canada contracts with a motor transportation service for the car-
riage of passengers to and from a federally-owned airport, that falls outside federal
jurisdiction: Re Colonial Coach Lines Ltd. and Ontario Highway Transport Board,
[1967] 2 O.R. 25, 243, 62 D.L.R. (2d) 270 (H.CJ.), 63 D.L.R. (2d) 198 (CA.).
48 See Shelfer v. City of London Electric Lighting Co., supra, note 12; Bennett v.
Grand Trunk R.W. Co. Ltd., (1901) 2 O.L.R. 425, (1902), 1 C.R.C. 451; Mader v.
The Halifax Electric Tramway Co., (1905) 37 S.C.R. 94, (1907), 5 C.R.C. 434.
49 Injurious affection of property by nuisance caused by a railway which fails to
comply with conditions precedent specified in statutory provisions applicable to the
railway resulted in liability for the railway: Dominion Iron and Steel Co. v. Burt,
[1917] A.C. 179; 33 D.L.R. 425; 20 C.R.C. 134.
5OPowell v. Toronto, Hamilton and Buffalo Railway Co. (1898), 25 O.A.R. 209.
Cf. The Montreal Street R.W. Co. v. Felix Gareau (1901), 31 S.C.R. 463; (1903), 2
C.R.C. 286, 10 Que. Q.B. 417, where the company was held liable in nuisance for vibra-
tions, (as well as for chimney smoke), as the court refused to follow English precedents
such as The King v. Pease (1832), 4 B. & Ad. 30; Hammersmith R.W. Co. v. Brand
(1869), L.R. 4 H.L. 171; and see also Gareau v. The Montreal Street Railway Com-
pany (1901), 31 S.C.R. 463, 2 C.R.C. 297. See generally, Linden, Strict Liability,
Nuisance and Legislative Authorization (1966), 4 Osgoode Hall LJ. 196; and see Him-
melman v. Nova Construction Co. Ltd. (1969), 5 D.L.R. (3d) 56 (Gillis, J.) for a
discussion of negligence, nuisance, res ipsa loquitur, Rylands v. Fletcher, and the de-
fence of statutory authorization.
51 Manchester Corporation v. Farnworth, [1930] A.C. 171 at 183, quoted with ap-
proval by Lacourciere, J. in Plater v. Town of Collingwood, [1968] 1 O.R. 81 at 85.
52 McNair, supra, note 33 at 444.
53 Lesser, The Aircraft Noise Problem: Federal Power but Local Liability, supra,
note 16 at 184-188 where he discusses in detail decisions such as Allegheny Airlines v.
Village of Cedarhurst, 238, F. 2d 812 (2d Cir. 1956), and City of Newark v. Eastern
Airlines, Inc., 159 F. Supp. 750 (D.NJ. 1958).
54 With the exception, for example, of cases such as Stagg v. City of Santa Monica,
2 Cal. App. 3d 318, 82 Cal. Rptr. 578, 11 Av. Cas. 17, 404 (Ct. App. 1969) which re-
lied on Loma Portal Civic Club v. American Airlines, Inc., 61 Cal. 2d 582, 394 P.
2d 548, 39 Cal. Rptr. 708, 9 Av. Cas. 17, 165 (1964); and Township of Hanover v.
Town of Morristown, 108 NJ. Super. 461, 261 A. 2d 692, 11 Av. Cas. 17, 436 (Ch.
1969); and see Baumeister, Aviation Law - Federal Preemption - Efficient Utiliza-
tion of Airspace (1971), 2 Seton Hall L Rev. 474.
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of take-offs; 55 prohibiting flights below certain altitudes;58 closure of take-off
paths and landing approaches of an airport).57
Noise Pollution
To properly assess the problem of noise pollution from a legal standpoint
some familiarity with the science of noise is of assistance.
We have noted that a definition of noise, is unwanted or undesirable
sound. Such a definition of course makes readily apparent that the problem
of noise pollution, although objective in its measurement, is purely subjective
in its assessment and this is a feature which should be remembered when
considering remedies in this area.
Sound, or noise, has three constituent properties: volume, pitch and
duration, and each of these properties is capable of isolation and measure-
ment. The property we are most concerned with in noise pollution is volume
which is measurable in units of decibels (dB). Since the decibel scale is
logarithmic, an increase of ten decibels signifies a tenfold increase in sound
level. But the loudness of sound perceived by the human ear depends upon
frequency and the standard decibel scale does not adjust for variations in
frequency. Consequently, a different scale is required in order to more accu-
rately measure the perceived level of sound emitted by airport noise, and the
most common is the Perceived Noise Level Scale (PNdB). s
One further aspect of noise pollution in respect of airports, is the related
problem of sonic boom.8 9 Generally speaking, sonic boom may be of two
types - transient and continuous. A transient sonic boom is produced by an
aircraft diving vertically to the surface of the ground at supersonic speed
thereby setting up a shock front which moves perpendicular to the ground
at the speed of the aircraft as the aircraft pulls out of its dive. A continuous
55 Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc. v. City of Burbank, 318 F. Supp. 914 (C.D. Cal.
1970).
56 Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Village of Cedarhurst, 132 F. Supp. 871 (E.D. N.Y.
1955), aff'd. 238 F. 2d 812 (2d Cir. 1956); American Airlines, Inc. v. Audubon Park,
Kentucky, 297 F. Supp. 207 (W.D. Ky. 1968), aff'd. 407 F. 2d 1306 (6th Cir. 1969).
57 American Airlines, Inc. v. Town of Hempsted, 272 F. Supp. 226, (E.D. N.Y.
1967), aff'd. 398 F. 2d 369 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied 393 U.S. 1017 (1969).
58 See generally, Hellman & Zwislocki, Some Factors Affecting the Estimation of
Loudness (1964), 33 Jul. Acoust. Soc. Am. 687 and Robinson, A Note on the Sub-
jective Evaluation of Noise (1964), 1 Jnl. Sound & Vibration 468.
59 For further discussion of sonic boom, see generally, Hopkins and McIntosh,
Is Sonic Boom an Explosion? (1957), Ins. L. Jnl. 15; Roth, Sonic Boom: A Definition
and Some Legal Implications (1958), 25 J. Air L. & Com. 68; Rosevear, supra, note 21;
Arkin, Burdick, Joyner, Sonic Boom - A Legal Nightmare (1966), 19 Okla. L Rev.
292; Baxter, The SST: From Watts to Harlem in Two Hours (1968), 21 Stan. L. Rev.
1; Katz, The Function of Tort Liability in Technology Assessment (1969), U. Cincin-
nati L. Rev. 587 at 655; Ticer, supra, note 16 at 181, 187; Stratford, Air Transport
Economics in the Supersonic Era (London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1967) at 298
et. seq.; Richards, Noise Problems Associated with Supersonic Flight with Emphasis on
Structural Aspects of the Problem, Proceedings of the Sixth Israel Annual Conference
on Aviation and Astronautics, February, 1964; FitzGerald, Aircraft Noise in the Vicinity
of Aerodromes and Sonic Boom (1971), 21 U. of T. L. J. 226.
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sonic boom is caused by an aircraft travelling at supersonic speed horizontal
to the surface of the earth thereby setting up continuous shock fronts which
move along the ground at the same speed as the aircraft.
When either type of shock front reaches a person, he will hear a loud
noise similar to an explosion because a certain amount of energy has been
suddenly transfered to his ears. Such shock fronts have caused property
damage to glass, and plaster, and other objects, as well as disrupting rural
domesticity by frightening animals to such a degree as to interfere with their
productivity. The intensity of the shock front - and thus the possible damage
potential - depends upon the size and speed of the aircraft, and the height
of the aircraft above the earth's surface. If technical evidence can establish
that a sonic boom is an explosion, it may be possible for a plaintiff to claim
damages in a suit for negligence 0 and/or nuisance.
In a recent Canadian case involving sonic boom, Gagnon v. The Queen,61
brought in the Exchequer Court of Canada, the suppliant claimed damages
for personal injuries on the ground that the pilot was negligent and reckless,
and failed to comply with applicable regulations. Noel, J. in rendering the
reasons for judgment, held the Crown liable even though the aircraft involved
were foreign, on the ground that a breach of statutory regulations constitutes
tortious conduct, (which the respondent did not rebut).62 After summarizing
the expert evidence on sonic boom, the court points out that the suppliant,
who was driving his motorcycle when he alleged he was involved in an acci-
dent caused by sonic boom, may have been affected "by the surprise or pain
occasioned by the exceedingly loud noise described by those who heard it,
and by the suppliant himself. ' ' 3
Effects of Noise Pollution
Noise pollution can have harmful effects on both the individual and his
property. With respect to the individual, the principal physiological effect of
noise is loss of hearing sensitivity." This can be a total loss of hearing
(conductive loss or blast trauma) caused by a single exposure to an intense
sound impulse, e.g., a sonic boom; or it can be a partial loss of hearing
(sensorineural loss) caused by continuous routine subjection to high levels of
noise - airplane departures every five minutes.P
The most important factor in loss of hearing sensitivity is the temporary
sound threshold shift, i.e., the hearing level is elevated by noise exposure and
then, after a time, returns to its pre-exposure level. The potential harm here,
of course, is that continual exposure will not allow the threshold to descend
30 Cf. Gagnon v. Regina, supra, note 15.
61 Supra, note 15.
62 Id., at 736, relying on Sterling Trusts Corporation v. Postma [1965] S.C.R. 324,
329. Generally, see Buxton v. Carriss, [1958] S.C.R. 441, Otash v. Sonnenberg (1968)
67 D.L.R. (2d) 311; Van Oudenhove v. D'Aoust (1970), 8 D.L.R. (3d) 145.
63 Id., at 724.
64 The Physiological Effects of Noise, address by S. E. Forshaw to the Conference
on Noise in the Environment, Toronto, April 28-29, 1971.
O5Id.
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to its pre-exposure level, and consequently the sound perception threshold of
the ear will be permanently increased. 6
Noise pollution not only can cause loss of hearing sensitivity, but also
has certain non-auditory effects. For example, noise may cause blood vessels
to constrict with resultant higher blood pressure and an increased propensity
for strokes, heart attacks and cerebral hemorrhages.07 It could also produce
certain short term secondary effects such as vertigo, nausea, nystagmus and
loss of equilibrium. 8
Apart from the physical consequences of noise pollution-both auditory
and non-auditory - there are pyschological and social consequences which
are equally undesirable. It is known that certain frequencies (600 - 4800
c.p.s.) are particularly important in the area of verbal communication and
hence background noise within this range of frequencies (for example, jet
engine noise at airports) can seriously interfere with such communication. 9
This of course would include interference with radio and television enjoyment,
as well as the enjoyment of music emanating from a stereo system exclusive
of an earphone attachment.
Furthermore, noise pollution can interfere with the process of falling
asleep and can also affect the natural "deepness" of one's normal pattern
of sleep.7°
Because there is a subjective aspect in regard to the effects of noise
pollution, one must speak in terms of the norm. Studies have shown that such
noisy interferences with communication and with the natural pattern of sleep
can cause frustration which may lead to tension, fatigue and related psycho-
logical problems and may consequently reduce the efficiency and productivity
of the individual.
71
It follows that noise pollution, such as that which emanates from air-
ports, could cause serious harm to the individual not only in terms of direct
physical harm such as a hearing loss, but also with respect to a person's
psychological and social well-being.
The effects of noise pollution are not confined to the individual person,
but also encompass and affect a person's enjoyment of his real property. The
noise of jets making an approach to, or taking off from a nearby airport, is
hardly a saleable feature for real estate in adjacent urban developments and
hence the land values in such areas would no doubt be affected downward.
Moreover, continuous airport noise can severely interfere with the individual's
physical enjoyment of his property, even to the point of discouraging normal
neighborly conversation over a back fence.
06 Id.
6 7 Rosen & Olin, Hearing Loss & Coronary Heart Disease (1965), 82 Archives of
Otolaryngology 236.
68Supra, note 64.
69 K ryter & Williams, Masking of Speech by Aircraft Noise (1966), J. Acoust.
Soc. Am. 138.
70 Kryter, The Effects of Noise on Man (New York: Academic Press, 1970).
71 Woodhead, Effects of Brief, Loud Noise on Decision Making (1959), 31 J.
Acoust. Soc. Am. 1329.
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In sum, as an air force officer put it:
Noise, dust, vibration, smoke, powerful lights and flights through airspace at low
altitude over nearby private property are matters which are necessarily incidental
to normal air operations in and around airports. However, the inconveniences,
discomfort, and prejudice to the use and enjoyment of property and the resulting
loss in property values [give] rise to claims for damages ... 72
Judicial Consideration of Noise Pollution
Accepting the fact that noise pollution exists and interferes with and
adversely affects persons, property and use and enjoyment of property, what
cause of action (or causes) is available in the circumstances? Ubi jus, ibi
remedium - where there is a right, there is a remedy. It appears that the
present state of the law in Canada would permit an action in trespass, or
nuisance, or negligence.73 In the United States claims based upon inverse
condemnation (i.e., a taking of private property for public purposes without
compensation) 74 have been successful.
With respect to an action in trespass one of the first issues is that of
ownership or possession of the property in question, i.e., who owns or has
possession of the airspace superadjacent to an individual's property?74a
The common law graciously adopted as a principle of land ownership
the maxim expressed by Lord Coke in 1628, cujus est solum ejus est usque
ad coelum et ad inferos - he who owns the soil, owns it from the heavens to
the depths of the earth.75 Courts modified the literal meaning of the maxim,
and Lord Ellenborough in 1815 declared that in the absence of damage a
balloonist was not liable in trespass "at the suit of the occupier of every field
over which his balloon passes". 76 Accordingly, even before the advent of the
aeroplane, it became obvious that a landowner did not have exclusive rights.
In the United States the rights of persons over and the right to use the
superadjacent airspace have been classified under four headings: (1) aircraft
trespass when they fly within the owner's zone of "effective possession", or (2)
within the zone of the owner's actual use; (3) there is a right of action in
nuisance, and probably in negligence, when there is interference with the
user of land; and (4) all flights are trespass, but there is a privilege of "inno-
cent passage" in all airspace provided there is no unreasonable interference
with the landowner's use and enjoyment of his property. 77 There may be
72 Reed, Comment: Batten v. United States of America, supra, note 16 at 248.
73 See Richardson, Canadian Law of Civil Aviation (1942), 53 C.R.T.C. 321 at
328-332.
74 Sometimes also referred to as to a claim for money damages for a prescriptive
easement, and also called the Avigation Easement: see generally, Lowenfeld, supra,
note 16, section 2. 3.
74a For an interesting discussion of trespass in air space see Johnson, Rights in Air
Space (Manchester Univ. Press, 1965) at 70-74.
76 Broom's Legal Maxims (8th ed., 1911) 395. Generally, see Sackman, supra,
note 16.
76 Pickering v. Rudd (1815), 4 Camp. 219, 171 E.R. 70, 71.
77 Fleming, The Law of Torts (3rd ed., The Law Book Co. of Australasia Pty. Ltd.,
1965) at 45, 46. Prosser, Law of Torts (West Publishing Co., 1964) at 70-73. Cf. Sal-
mond, Law of Torts, ed. R. F. V. Heuston (15 ed. Sweet & Maxwell, 1969) at 56, 57.
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interference with user at low altitudes as distinct from the "upper reaches of
the atmosphere"; 78 but the ad coelum doctrine has been restricted so that
ownership is limited
.. to that part of the airspace as may be effectively possessed by the surface owner
or as is necessary to the reasonable use of the surface land ... [and] such owner-
ship of the superadjacent airspace is merely a qualified ownership and ... the
surface owner has title only to that part of the airspace as is in his actual posses-
sion ... [and furthermore] the upper reaches of the atmosphere are in the public
domain and ... the surface owner's title, if any, is subject to the right of public
passage.79
The American position on the cujus est solum maxim is:
In a series of decisions such as Thrasher v. Atlanta in which the maxim 'Cujus
est solum ... ' is held to be mere dicta, Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport, denying
the possibility of air space ownership and limiting possession to 'actual use', and
Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., denying recovery for trespass and basing
recovery on nuisance or negligence, ownership of airspace was limited basically
to the area of use of the landowner and made subject to the public need in re-
gard to air commerce. In 1946 Justice Douglas, speaking for the Supreme Court
of the United States, in United States v. Causby, stated that the maxim 'Cujus
est solum ... ' 'had no place in the modem world ... ' but, the opinion went on
to state, the landowner does have paramount rights of ownership in the adjacent
air space to a 'reasonable' height. In effect, the decision in Causby provides a
two-edged sword. It limits unreasonable use of air space, while insuring the
rights of the landowner in the 'superadjacent' air space.S0
It appears that the Canadian jurisprudence on the subject of ownership,
possession and rights in, to and over the superadjacent airspace is not defi-
nitively settled. Aside from instances where aircraft are in breach of statutory
requirements and regulations, it is not too bold to suggest that in our com-
munity today the sensible approach would be to adopt and accept the concept
of qualified or limited ownership (and possession) of airspace - something
along the lines that there is a right of flight in the superadjacent airspace so
long as there is no unreasonable interference with the landowner's use and
enjoyment.
Noise pollution may be actionable as nuisance because of its deleterious
effect upon the person or property (as, for example, depreciation in value
of property).81 "For it is generally admitted" Professor Lloyd tells us "that
noise alone may constitute a nuisance, although in determining whether it is
in fact such a nuisance as to entitle the complaining party to relief at law or
in equity, the character, volume, time, place and duration of its occurrence,
as well as the locality, must be taken into consideration". 82 Accordingly,
7 8 Sackman, supra, note 16 at 239.
79 Id., at 239, 240.
80 Ellefson, Air Space Usage and Louisiana Law (1970-71), 17 Loyola L. Rev. 337
at 342; and see especially Benshoof, supra, note 16; for civil law aspects see Ellefson,
supra; Fink, supra, note 42 at 60 (McGill LJ.), at 147 (Chitty's L.J.); Mankiewicz,
Airport Noise - Compensation of Adjoining Landowners Under French Law: A Report
on a Case and Some Further Considerations (1969), 35 J. Air L & Com. 238.
8' Gagnon v. Dominion Stamping Co. (1914), 7 O.W.N. 530. See also Newell v.
Izzard (1943), 17 M.P.R. 185 (N.B. S.C.) and Huston v. Lloyd Refineries Ltd., [1937]
O.W.N. 53.
82Noise as a Nuisance (1934), 82 U. Penn. L. Rev. 567 at 569.
1972]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
matters to consider in an action in nuisance for noise pollution are: (1) noise
by definition is a subjective matter and the plaintiff must show that his physi-
cal discomfort would be that of the average man;8 (2) the character of the
neighbourhood will determine the standard of nuisance; (3) given the
character of the neighbourhood the court must determine what is an accept-
able noise level under these circumstances;8 (4) the time and duration of the
noise;80 (5) the noise source, since some sources have been found to be
legal nuisances;87 (6) whether or not the plaintiff came to the nuisance;8
(7) the social utility of the defendant's operation;89 and (8) the cost of abat-
ing the noise; °0 if the noise is of a continuing, permanent nature and causes
injury to property, damages rather than injunctive relief may be given.91
As for the relief the plaintiff may be entitled to (damages and/or injunction)
in a nuisance action, consideration must be given to the particular fact situa-
tion i.e., whether the nuisance will continue; whether the plaintiffs property
will diminish in value; the type of nuisance and the practical feasibility of
enjoining the defendant; and whether the property of the plaintiff has been
injuriously affected.92 When considering whether or not aircraft noise consti-
tutes nuisance the height of the subject aircraft and the quantum of noise
must, of course, be taken into account.
In the United States the courts have provided a remedy for noise pollu-
tion through the action based on inverse condemnation, i.e., the taking with-
out compensation, or what we might call expropriation.93 Such an action
might be available in Canadian courts if the landowner making the claim can
establish a proprietary right in the airspace over his land, and one must
remember that the entire aeronautical field is within federal jurisdiction, and
so long as there is no breach of any statutory or regulatory provision, aircraft
8s Betts v. Penge U.D.C., [1942] 2 K.B. 154.
84Drysdale v. Dugas (1896), 26 S.C.R. 20 (S.C.C.); see also Maker v. Davanne
Holdings Ltd., [1954] O.R. 935.
85 Gagnon v. Dominion Stamping Co., supra, note 81.
80 Cooke v. Kingston Infants' Home (1932), 41 O.W.N. 279 (Ont. H.C.); Gagnon
V. Dominion Stamping, supra, note 81; Taylor v. Mullen Coal Co. (1915), 21 D.LR.
841 (Ont. C.A.); McMaster v. Bell Bros. (1931), 40 O.W.N. 536; Halsey v. Esso
Petroleum Co. Ltd., [1961] 2 All E.R. 145.
87 Taylor v. Mullen Coal Co., supra, note 86; Halsey v. Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd.,
supra, note 86.
88 Bliss v. Hall (1838), 132 E.R. 758; but note also Pope v. Peate, (1904) 7 O.L.R.
207.
80 Cotton v. Ont. Motor Co. (1916), 11 O.W.N. 100.
00 Halsey v. Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd., supra, note 86.
O1 Shelfer v. City of London Electric Lighting Company, supra, note 12.
02 See, for example, Russell Transport Ltd. v. Ontario Malleable Iron Co. Ltd.,
[1952] 4 D.L.R. 719 at 728 et passim, (McRuer, CJ.H.C.); Plater v. Town of Colling-
wood, supra, note 51 at 86-89 (Lacourciere, J.); Hopkin v. Hamilton Electric Light and
Cataract Power Co., supra note 39; Powell v. Toronto, Hamilton and Buffalo Railway
Company, supra, note 50; cf. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Company Inc., 55 Misc. 2d
1023 (1967); 30 A.D. 2d 480 (1968); 31 A.D. 2d 578; 26 N.Y. 2d 219 (1970); 309
N.Y.S. 2d 312 (1970); and see Slattery, Private Nuisance: Abatement of Air Pollution
in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Company, Inc. (1971), 54 Marquette L. Rev. 392.
03 US. v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
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can penetrate, use and fly over a landowner's airspace without fear of result-
ing action. There may be an easement covering the right to commit a nui-
sance,94 and possibly even to make noises and vibrations.95
Canadian Air Litigation
Like highways, airports become obsolete almost as soon as they are
designed on the drawing boards. With modem technological and planning
advances it may be possible to plan for the quiet airport through a variety
of devices: the quiet aircraft engine; land use planning and zoning require-
ments for appropriate location of airports in relation to residential and busi-
ness areas.96
While there has not been the same spate of cases one finds in American
jurisprudence on the subject of air carriers, nuisance, negligence and tras-
pass, the matter has been before the Canadian courts.
In Lacroix v. The Queen97 Fournier, J. of the Exchequer Court deals
with a claim made against the Crown where the suppliant alleged, inter alia,
that because of an expropriation of an easement on his and adjoining proper-
94 British Columbia Forest Products Limited v. Nordal (1954), 11 W.W.R. (N.S.)
403 at 406 (B.C. S.C.).
95 Megarry and Wade, The Law of Real Property, (3rd ed. Stevens & Sons Limited,
1966) at 874 who cite Elliotson v. Feetham (1835), 2 Bing. N.C. 134; Ball v. Ray
(1873), 8 Ch. App. 467 at 471, 472, and Sturges v. Bridgman (1879), 11 Ch. D. 852,
and then say, in footnote no. 24, at 874 that these "cases are unsatisfactory authorities,
for in none did the plaintiff succeed. If twenty year's user as of right could have been
shown, the question would have arisen whether such rights can lie in grant. This seems
highly questionable: there is no direct authority; contra Lemmon v. Webb, [1895]
A.C. 1..." This statement is accurate except that the Lemmon case is not particularly
useful as it involved overhanging tree branches. It is of some interest to note that in
Sturges v. Bridgman the defence plea of prescriptive right to commit a noise nuisance
was rejected, because, prior to the plaintiff's complaint, although the defendant had
created noise using his equipment, that noise was not actionable nuisance. Salmond on
Torts, supra, note 77, 82, 83, suggests that there may be a prescriptive right to commit
a private nuisance, and that the result in Sturges v. Bridgman is based on the fact that it
was not sufficient for the defence to show a long continued "nuisance to other people in
the occupation of other property" because the right "can be acquired only against
specific property, not against all the world"; however, a public nuisance cannot "be
legalised by prescription". In Russell Transport, supra, note 92, at 729, 730, MeRuer,
CJ.H.C. notes that the dictum in Sturges to the effect that whether or not a nuisance
exists depends on the particular locality "is not to be broadly applied" since it "was an
expression used in a case arising out of noise and vibration". An easement for access
and use of air for a dwelling-house, work-shop or other building cannot be acquired by
prescription: The Limitations Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 246, s. 33.
96 See, for example, the proposed new airport developments announced by the
federal and Ontario governments on Thursday, March 2, 1972: The Windsor Star,
Friday, March 3, 1972, at 1, 3, 20. With respect to the proposed Windsor air facilities
it was stated (id., at 20): "Location of the new runway will reduce the level of noise
over adjacent communities". And a story in The Globe and Mail, Saturday, March 4,
1972 at 1 stated: "The province yesterday restricted development of land in what will
be the high-noise zone of the international airport to be built in Pickering Township
and Markham."
:9 [1954] Ex. C.R. 69, [1954] 4 D.L.R. 470, (1955) 72 C.R.T.C. 89. The Exchequer
Court is now known as the Federal Court of Canada: Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1970,
c. 10 (2nd Supp.).
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ties for a lighting system this created a flightway over his land which aircraft
would use to land or take off at Dorval Airport; and the Crown is liable to
him in damages in that it interfered with his right of ownership which in-
cludes the surface and what is below and above his land thereby interfering
with his enjoyment of his property.
Fournier, J. explains that the lighting system was installed to assist aerial
navigation and as such did not establish a flightway to and from the airport.
As the subject property was in the Province of Quebec, he looks to the Civil
Code which is in effect there, and which states in s. 414 "that the owner of
the soil is also the owner of what is above and what is below," which contains
the essence of the same provision in the Code Napoleon. Lord Coke's maxim
has been restricted in its application; it is not given literal effect; and aerial
flights are permitted over property so long as there is no interference with
the use and enjoyment of the property by the owner.98 The court goes on to
point out that the suppliant was using the land intermittently for agricultural
purposes and was not living on that land. If the suppliant's contention were
accepted, Fournier, J. says, that would be an admission "that air and space
may be appropriated or possessed" and he concludes:
In my view, air and space are not susceptible of ownership and fall in the category
of res omnium communis, which does not mean that the owner of the soil is
deprived of the right of using his land for plantations and constructions or in
any way which is not prohibited by law or against the public interest.
It seems to me that the owner of land has a limited right in the air space over
his property; it is limited by what he can possess or occupy for the use and
enjoyment of his land. By putting up buildings or other constructions the owner
does not take possession of the air but unites or incorporates something to the
surface of his land. This which is annexed or incorporated to his land becomes
part and parcel of the property.
The Crown could not expropriate that which is not susceptible of possession. It
is contrary to fact to say that by the so-called establishment of a flightway and
the flying of planes it had taken any property belonging to the suppliant or inter-
fered with his rights of ownership.
In this instance it did not appropriate any air or space over his land and did not
interfere with his rights. I need go only so far as to say that the owner of land
is not and cannot be the owner of the unlimited air space over his land, because
air and space fall in the category of res omnium communis. For these reasons
the suppliant's claim for damages by reason of the so-called establishment of a
flightway over his land fails.99
In 1958 when Robert Shepherd purchased his house near Dorval Airport
(in the Montreal area) it should have been clear to him that there would be
increased aircraft activity at the airport; and further in his deed it was speci-
fied that the property was subject to the Montreal Airport Zoning Regula-
tions. Hence when he brought suit 00 against the Crown for damages because
of the airport's operation - low flying jet aircraft, noise, gasoline odors,
08 This is adopted by the court from an article, Richardson, Private Property Rights
in the Air Space at Common Law (1953), 31 Can. Bar Rev. 117 at 134-36.
99 Id., at 96 (C.R.T.C.). Emphasis added.
100 [1964] Ex. C.R. 274. For cases dealing with railways and nuisance which, in
general, held that the railways, exercising their rights conferred by statute, were not
liable in nuisance unless they acted oppressively, see: Bennett v. Grand Trunk R.W. Co.
Ltd., supra, note 48; Montreal Street Railway Co. v. Gareau supra, note 50.
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glaring runway lights, loss of tenants, risk hazards - and because of the
registration of a servitude over his property (restricting the height of build-
ings, trees and obstructions), Dumoulin, J. of the Exchequer Court allowed
him damages by reason of the servitude for depreciation of the value of his
property and for trees felled on his property, but rejected his claim concern-
ing the airport's operations. He cites Lacroix with approval, and says that the
construction of the airport "is a perfectly normal enterprise, offending against
no law, and therefore its activities are governed by appropriately attuned
rules of objective responsibility, the law of torts," and he concludes:
Just as one may expect a hospital to create a silent zone, it is as natural for an
airfield's regular trade to be carried on in an atmosphere of perpetual noise.
Alone the transgression of the unavoidable measure of annoyances fosters a case
of delictual liability.101
Highways in the air cannot be established: Atlantic Aviation Ltd. v.
Nova Scotia Light and Power Co. Ltd.102 In this case a flying school operator
alleged that the defendant's erection of transmission towers and lines near
the school interfered with aircraft operations. MacQuarrie, . dismissed the
action, and said the defendant has lawfully used its own lands (but it could
be so prevented if zoning regulations were passed under the Aeronautics
Act, and none were passed herein).
Where it was claimed that low flying aircraft caused losses to mink
ranches, their claim was dismissed in Darowany v. The Queen'03 as the sup-
pliant could not establish that the pilots were servants of the Crown nor that
the flying was negligent causing the damages claimed. Similarly where a
scheduled airline flew over a mink ranch, and the rancher claimed damages
for negligence because of the aircraft noise, the claim was dismissed in Nova
Mink Ltd. v. T.C.A. 1°4 The pilot was not aware of the existence and location
of this particular farm, and the court said that the situation did not present
101 Id., at 280, 281. For a different viewpoint see Lesser, supra, note 16 at 195,
196, where he describes the successes of property owners; and see The New York Times,
Wednesday, July 21, 1971, Jet Noise Dooming Homes Near Los Angeles Airport, supra,
note 16, which tells of the acquisition by the City of Los Angeles of homes near the air-
port because of the jet noise. The court incidentally mentions that the Minister has
authority by virtue of the Aeronautics Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 2, s. 3(c) to construct and
maintain government aerodromes.
102 (1965), 55 D.L.R. (2d) 554 (N.S. S.C.). The court, like Fournier, J. in
Lacroix repeats portions of Richardson's article in 31 Can. Bar Rev. 117, supra, note
98. Where an aeroplane was in lawful flight in accordance with Air Regulations passed
under the Aeronautics Act, and hit power lines over navigable waters without having ob-
tained permission under the Navigable Waters' Protection Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 140, s. 4, it
was held the wires were a public nuisance on the navigable waters, and damages were
awarded to the plaintiffs: Stephens and Mathias v. MacMillan and MacMillan, [1954]
O.R. 133; [1954] O.W.N. 176; (1954) 71 C.R.T.C. 101 (Ont. H.CJ., McLennan, J.).
Cf. United States v. Causby, supra, note 93 at 261, where Douglas, J. says: "The air is
a public highway, as Congress has declared."
103 [1956] Ex. C.R. 340.
1o4 Supra, note 15.
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a "forseeable risk of contact" nor did it suggest "a probability of harm... as
to give rise to a duty of care"'10 5 to avoid the farm by a greater distance than
that at which the aircraft flew.
Some Considerations
In any discussion of aeronautical noise the remedies which are or may
be available are a focal point for discussion; and the obtaining of these
remedies requires action by private citizens or the public authorities or a
combination of both. The customary remedies are legal actions in nuisance,
trespass and negligence (and in the United States the "taking" approach by
use of the inverse condemnation concept). Improvements in aircraft, managed
use of runways, air traffic control devices (and even ground traffic control as
the noise from motor vehicles increases), relocation of airports and zoning and
land use plans for the development of airport and adjacent areas-all of these
are suggested.10 6 Actions against airport operators have been instituted in the
United States.'0 7 In the Canadian context, as Rosevear, former Air Canada
counsel tells us, airports and air navigation are within the federal domain,
and to succeed in an action against the Crown regard must be had to the
Crown Liability Act'0 8 which provides that no proceedings lie against the
Crown for the acts or omissions of its servant "unless the act or omission
would apart from the provisions of this Act have given rise to a cause of
action in tort against that servant or his personal representative." From which
Rosevear concludes that "it is unlikely that an action against the Crown,
founded on noise levels, would be successful since there could be no sugges-
tion of the negligence of a servant or agent of the Crown."' 0 9
The Minister of Transport can pass zoning regulations governing the
height and location of buildings and other structures near airports; I 0 and
these must be published in two newspapers serving the airport area;"' and
any person whose property is injuriously affected by such zoning regulation
can recover compensation from the Crown.'1 In Roberts and Bagwell v.
105 Id., at 264.
100 See particularly Ticer, supra, note 16.
107 See, for example, Griggs v. County of Allegheny (1961), 402 Pa. 411, 168 A.
2d 123, (1962) 369 U.S. 84; and see also Rosevear, supra, note 21. For a discussion of
the problems concerning actions involving the air traffic controller and air traffic control
systems, see Flynn, Avigation And The Law (1972) 4 Southwestern U.L. Rev. 176.
108 R.S.C. 1970, c. C-38, s. 4(2).
109 Supra, note 21 at 5. There may, of course, be specific exceptions to this where
a Crown servant or agent disobeys or misunderstands governmental rules and regula-
tions. Cf. Saguenay Peat Moss Company v. The Queen, [1966] Ex. C.R. 333, where it
was alleged that one of the Crown's low flying aircraft caused a fire in a peat bog
because of trails of hot flame and gases escaping during vertical assents, Noel, J. dis-
missed the claim for lack of proof and noted that the particular type of aircraft could
not possibly have caused the fire.
110 Aeronautics Act, supra, note 17 s. 6(1) CQ).
111 Id., s. 6(7).
112 Id., s. 6(10).
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The Queen" 8 such a claim was successfully made because of the enactment of
certain Toronto Malton Airport Zoning Regulations. Nolan, J. in giving the
Supreme Court of Canada's reasons notes that the subject area was under
an official plan and was an area of subdivision control as provided by the
Ontario Planning Act." 4 The court concludes: "Vertical regulation is neces-
sary in the vicinity of airports and the vesting of the powers mentioned
operates with an immediate effect on the use and value of the land. It be-
comes at once a burden on the land and the resulting diminution in value
is a proper subject for compensation.""15
These zoning regulations may also cover prohibitions and requirements
concerning lands adjacent to airports, or may deal with the construction or
use of buildings or structures on such adjacent lands."0 Presumably any
zoning regulations enacted by the federal government with a view to noise
control could result in claims for compensation on the ground of diminution
in value of property. Insofar as governmental control and regulation is con-
cerned in interfering with private use of land, there is, as we have seen, legis-
lative protection for any decrease in value of property;"1 but to what extent,
if any, noise pollution from aeronautical sources could be said to be related
to or connected with such claims for compensation is anybody's guess. In
any event, we perhaps should remember the stricture stated by Idington, J. in
Canada Paper Company v. Brown"8 in the conflict between private and pub-
lic interests:
The invasion of rights incidental to the ownership of property, or the confiscation
thereof, may suit the grasping tendencies of some and incidentally the needs or
desires of the majority in any community benefiting thereby; yet such a basis or
principle of action should be stoutly resisted by our courts, in answer to any
such like demands or assertions of social right unless and until due compensa-
tion made by due process of law.
Conclusion
Pollution, noise or any kind, may be fadism; reality; problem and
challenge for the private and public sectors of our community - but how-
ever we may characterize pollution and its effects, we face differences of
opinion about our capacities to cope. In 1899 Veblen spoke of mental adapta-
tion to new circumstances; and in 1970 Charles A. Reich in his dynamically
provocative book The Greening of America" 9 adopts a different stance when
he ponders whether we can ever catch up to advancing technology: 20
Noise, whether of jets, supersonic planes, or tote gotes on a forest trail, attack
us all ... We have a large capacity to get used to such discomforts, but the
technology seems to force us faster than we can adapt.'2 o
11[ 1957] S.C.R. 28, (1957) 75 C.R.T.C. 77.
4 Id., at 39-42 (S.C.R.).
15 Id., at 38.
"60 Supra, note 110.
117 Supra, note 113.
118 (1921), 63 S.C.R. 243, 248.
"19 (Bantam Books of Canada Ltd., June 1971).
120Id., at 186, 187.
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Whether it is the local or the international arena, the problems of aero-
nautical noise are much the same; and, Professor Lowenfeld, succinctly and
aptly knits it all together in these words:
Consider where the noise debate stands after ten years of dispute. The communi-
ties near airports seem to be forced (occasionally with monetary compensation)
to put up with at least the pre-1969 generation of jets at their present level of
noise, with the next generation of aircraft a little bit, but not a great deal, quieter.
The aviation community, on the other hand, has come to realize that all over
the world it is becoming extremely difficult to find any place to erect new and
badly needed airports. Thus the outcome as of the beginning of the 1970's appears
to be a stand-off. Neither side is strong enough to force its own will, but each
side seems strong enough to block new developments contrary to its wi1l.121
121 Lofenfield, supra, note 16, chapter V, section 5.4, 144.
